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Abstract	
Assessing	 the	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 is	 a	 challenging	 task	 due	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	
actors	 involved,	 variety	 of	 pathways	 to	 success,	 range	 of	 defensive	 measures	
employed,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 detailed	 historical	 record	 upon	 which	 to	 base	 aiiinalysis.	
Numerical	 models	 developed	 to	 date	 vary	 wildly	 in	 both	 approach	 and	 ultimate	
assessment:	estimates	of	the	 likelihood	a	nuclear	terrorist	attack	differ	by	up	to	nine	
orders	 of	 magnitude.	 This	 paper	 critiques	 existing	 efforts	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	
probability	 theory,	 and	 proposes	 an	 alternative	 perspective	 on	 the	 utility	 of	 risk	
assessment	in	this	area.	Nuclear	terrorism	is	argued	to	be	a	‘virtual	risk’	for	which	it	is	
not	 possible	 to	 meaningfully	 ascribe	 a	 quantitative	 measure,	 making	 numerical	
estimates	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 misleading.	 Instead,	 we	 argue	 that	
focus	should	be	placed	on	utilising	models	to	identify	areas	of	disagreement	as	targets	
for	further	research,	with	greater	emphasis	on	understanding	terrorist	decision-making	
and	adaption	in	response	to	nuclear	security	measures.	
Introduction	
The	fourth	and	final	Nuclear	Security	Summit,	held	in	the	United	States	in	March	2016,	
capped	 six	 years	 of	 sustained	 international	 effort	 to	 reduce	 the	 threat	 of	 nuclear	
terrorism.	 Over	 this	 period	 billions	 of	 dollars	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 a	 broad	 range	 of	
nuclear	 security	 initiatives.	 States	 have	 minimised	 their	 use	 of	 sensitive	 nuclear	
materials,	 in	 particular	 highly	 enriched	 uranium	 (HEU);	 increased	 the	 physical,	
information,	and	human	security	of	nuclear	and	radiological	 facilities;	developed	and	
implemented	 new	 national	 nuclear	 security	 legislation;	 employed	 systems	 to	 detect	
nuclear	material	outside	of	regulatory	control;	and	made	preparations	to	mitigate	the	
ultimate	effects	should	an	incident	occur.1		
Given	 this	 level	 of	 investment,	 significant	 attention	 has	 also	 been	 directed	 at	
measuring	the	effectiveness	of	these	efforts	and	whether	they	have	indeed	served	to	
reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism.	Here	 there	 are	 several	 approaches	 that	 can	 be	
taken.	 Narrowly	 focused	 assessments	 might,	 for	 example,	 measure	 security	 culture	
improvements	 within	 a	 specific	 organisation	 as	 a	 result	 of	 targeted	 education	 and	
																																								 																				
1	 Sharon	 Squassoni,	 “Outcomes	 from	 the	 2014	 Nuclear	 Security	 Summit,”	 Centre	 for	 Strategic	 and	
International	 Studies	 Critical	 Questions,	 March	 25th,	 2014,	 accessed	 1st	 July	 2016,	
http://csis.org/publication/outcomes-2014-nuclear-security-summit.	
training	 programmes.	Others	 analyses	 are	 broader	 and	 seek	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	
multiple	 measures,	 for	 example	 the	 NTI	 Nuclear	 Material	 Security	 Index,	 which	
provides	 a	 national	 level	 public	 assessment	 of	 both	 the	 threat	 and	 nuclear	 security	
conditions	 within	 different	 states.2	 As	 the	 scope	 of	 assessment	 broadens,	 the	
complexity	of	the	task	increases	due,	in	part,	to	the	heterogeneous	and	covert	nature	
of	 possible	 nuclear	 terrorist	 groups,	 their	 unique	 context,	 and	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	
security	systems	with	which	they	interact.	
Despite	this	complexity	a	number	of	mathematical	models	have	been	used	to	produce	
quantitative	 estimates	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 nuclear	 terrorist	 attack.	 These	 have	 an	
intrinsic	 appeal	 to	 both	 the	 public	 and	 policy-makers,	 serving	 to	 simplify	 complex	
problems	and	providing	a	seemingly	scientific	and	straightforward	way	of	assessing	the	
effectiveness	of	programmes	or	policies.3	However,	serious	problems	can	occur	when	
there	is	no	consensus	on	the	models	used	or	the	estimates	they	produce.	This	issue	is	
particularly	acute	in	the	case	of	nuclear	terrorism,	with	expert	estimates	of	the	annual	
probability	 of	 an	 attack	 ranging	 from	one	 in	 three	billion	 to	more	 than	one	 in	 two.4	
																																								 																				
2	 “NTI	 Nuclear	 Security	 Index,”	 Nuclear	 Threat	 Initiative,	 accessed	 February,	 10,	 2016,	
http://ntiindex.org/.	
3	Theodore	M.	Porter,	Trust	 in	numbers:	 the	pursuit	of	objectivity	 in	science	and	public	 life,	 (Princeton	
University	Press,	1995):	Chapter	4.	
4	 John	 Mueller,	 “The	 Atomic	 Terrorist:	 Assessing	 the	 Likelihood,”	 conference	 paper,	 Program	 on	
International	 Security,	 University	 of	 Chicago,	 (2008):	 14;	 Graham	 T.	 Allison,	 Nuclear	 Terrorism:	 The	
Ultimate	Preventable	Catastrophe,	(Macmillan,	2004):	15.	
Perhaps	 surprisingly,	 despite	 this	 clear	 disparity,	 the	 use	 of	 high-level	 numerical	
estimates	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 is	 widespread.	 They	 appear	 in	 public	 discourse,	 are	
referenced	 throughout	 the	 academic	 literature,	 and	 can	 be	 found	 in	 government	
testimony,	thus	influencing	nuclear	security	decision-making	at	the	highest	levels.5		
This	 paper	 discusses	 the	 challenge	 of	 assessing	 the	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism,	
highlighting	 the	 serious	 pitfalls	 that	 are,	 we	 feel,	 an	 inevitability	 when	 carrying	 out	
numerical	analysis.	Beginning	by	introducing	the	process	of	risk	assessment,	this	paper	
outlines	 two	 broad	 interpretations	 of	 probability	 –	 the	 Frequentist	 and	 subjective	
Bayesian	 approaches	 –	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 produce	 numerical	 estimates	 of	 the	
likelihood	of	nuclear	terrorism.		Three	different	categories	of	risk	are	then	considered,	
with	nuclear	terrorism	demonstrated	to	be	a	‘virtual	risk’	which	defies	straightforward	
quantification.	Existing	approaches	to	modelling	the	likelihood	of	nuclear	terrorism	are	
then	 critiqued,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 event	 tree	 analysis,	 a	 common	 and	
straightforward	modelling	approach.	Finally,	alternative	perspectives	on	 the	utility	of	
risk	 modelling	 and	 the	 useful	 insights	 they	 can	 bring	 when	 considering	 nuclear	
terrorism	are	presented.		
Approaches	to	risk	assessment	
																																								 																				
5	Nate	Silver,	“Crunching	the	Risk	Numbers,”	Wall	Street	Journal,	8th	 January,	2010;	Graham	T.	Allison,	
“Nuclear	Attack	a	Worst-Case	Reality?”	The	Washington	Times,	23rd	April,	2008;	Michael	Crowley,	“Yes,	
Obama	really	is	worried	about	a	Manhattan	nuke,”	Time,	26th	March,	2014.	
Although	 widely	 applied,	 risk	 is	 an	 elusive	 concept	 with	 divergent	 interpretations	
across	different	 fields	making	a	precise	definition	difficult.	 In	general	 terms,	 risks	are	
associated	 with	 certain	 events	 or	 activities	 and	 incorporate	 three	 distinct	 notions:	
hazard,	likelihood,	and	consequence.6	A	hazard	exists	as	a	source	of	danger;	it	is	what	
can	go	wrong.	Every	hazard	has	a	likelihood	of	occurring	and,	if	indeed	it	does	occur,	a	
range	of	consequences	will	follow.	
In	essence,	a	risk	analyst	collects	together	a	set	of	hazards,	assigns	likelihoods	to	their	
occurrence	 and	 then,	 assuming	 the	 events	 in	 question	 do	 occur,	 considers	
consequences	attendant	upon	the	range	of	possible	occurrences.	The	“risk”	associated	
with	a	given	system	is	a	 function	of	 likelihood	and	consequence	for	this	collection	of	
potential	hazards.7	When	dealing	with	 complex	phenomena	 such	as	 terrorist	 activity	
we	use	 the	 alternative	 terminology	 scenario	 as	 opposed	 to	hazard.	While	 a	 terrorist	
group	 is	 clearly	 a	 hazard,	 this	 language	 emphasises	 the	 specific	 context	 under	
consideration,	that	is,	the	group	together	with	a	range	of	possible	actions	that	could	be	
undertaken.		
																																								 																				
6	Stanley	Kaplan	and	B.	John	Garrick,	“On	the	quantitative	definition	of	risk,”	Risk	Analysis,	1	(1981):	11-
27.	
7	Many	potential	hazards	may	 fall	outside	 the	ambit	of	our	collective	knowledge	resulting	 in	so-called	
Black	Swan	events,	as	discussed	by	Nassim	Taleb	in	his	book	of	the	same	name.	
In	 the	 domain	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 a	 frequently	 discussed	 scenario	 is	 the	 terrorist	
acquisition	 of	 fissile	 material	 and	 subsequent	 fabrication	 of	 an	 Improvised	 Nuclear	
Device	(IND).8	For	the	purposes	of	risk	analysis	the	details	of	such	a	scenario	should	be	
reasonably	specific.	For	example,	a	group	could	purchase	fissile	material	on	the	black	
market	 using	 contacts	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 before	 shipping	 it	 to	 a	 safe	 haven	 in	 the	
Middle	 East	 through	 known	 drug	 trafficking	 routes.	 At	 a	 well-equipped	 facility	 a	
scientific	 team	then	engineers	a	crude	nuclear	device	using	specialist	equipment	and	
other	materials	that	have	been	legitimately	purchased	on	the	open	market.	Finally,	the	
group	 transports	 the	 IND	 to	 the	 target	 location,	 the	capital	 city	of	a	nearby	country,	
and	detonates	the	device.		
Given	this	scenario,	a	risk	analysis	would	consider	the	likelihood	and	consequences	of	
terrorist	 success.	 Likelihood	 of	 success	will	 depend	 upon	 a	myriad	 factors	 including,	
but	not	 limited	 to,	 the	 financial	 arrangements	of	 the	 group,	 the	 availability	 of	 fissile	
material	 of	 sufficient	 quality	 and	 quantity	 on	 the	 black	market,	 the	 intelligence	 and	
nuclear	 security	 arrangements	of	 a	 number	of	 countries,	 and	 the	 technical	 ability	 of	
the	 assembled	 scientists,	 engineers,	 and	 technicians	 to	 successfully	 build	 a	 viable	
nuclear	 device.	 The	 consequences	 of	 a	 successful	 attack	 are	 similarly	 diverse	 and	
																																								 																				
8	Peter	D.	Zimmerman	and	Jeffrey	G.	Lewis,	“The	Bomb	in	the	Backyard,”	Foreign	Policy,	October	16th,	
2009,	accessed	July	1,	2016,	http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-bomb-in-the-backyard/.	
include	 the	potential	 collapse	of	 local	 governments,	 strain	on	 regional	 alliances,	 and	
economic	turmoil,	alongside	the	significant	physical	and	psychological	suffering	caused	
by	 the	 blast,	 fire,	 and	 fallout	 generated	 by	 the	 detonation.	 This	 short	 example	
highlights	 some	 of	 complexities	 found	 in	 analysing	 the	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 and	
represents	 just	 one	 of	 the	 many	 possible	 scenarios	 that	 could	 reasonably	 be	
considered.9	
When	 risk	 analysis	 is	 carried	 out	 numerically,	 relationships	 between	 a	 scenario,	 its	
likelihood,	and	 its	consequence	must	be	specified.	Commonly,	analysts	use	the	risk	=	
likelihood	x	consequence	equation,	or	similar.10	Many	quantitative	studies	concerning	
the	 risk	 of	 terrorism	 take	 this	 approach.11	 Quantified	 risk	 assessment	 relies	 on	 the	
determination	 of	 numerical	 values	 for	 likelihood	 –	 the	 probability	 of	 an	 event	
occurring,	and	its	consequence	–	the	relative	severity	of	the	event.	As	outlined	above	
such	scenarios	do	not	lend	themselves	to	easy	quantification.	This	paper	explores	the	
challenges	 associated	 with	 assessing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 nuclear	 terrorist	 events	 in	
																																								 																				
9	Charles	D.	Ferguson	and	William	C.	Potter,	The	Four	Faces	of	Nuclear	Terrorism,	(Routledge,	2005):	5.	
10	Mathematically,	this	formulation	presents	risk	as	the	‘expected	consequence’	of	the	hazard.	
11	Louis	Anthony	(Tony)	Cox,	 Jr,	“Some	Limitations	of	 ‘Risk	=	Threat	x	Vulnerability	x	Consequence’	 for	
Risk	Analysis	of	Terrorist	Attacks,”	Risk	Analysis,	28	(2008):	1749-1761.	
quantitative	 terms.	 Assessments	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 an	 act	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	
are	not	addressed	here,	although	have	been	discussed	elsewhere.12		
Frequentist	and	Subjective	Bayesian	probability	
When	determining	probabilities	 for	 events	 as	 part	 of	 a	 quantitative	 risk	 assessment,	
analysts	generally	adopt	either	the	Frequentist	or	subjective	Bayesian	interpretation	of	
probability.	 The	 former	 takes	 a	 “frequency	 view	 of	 probability”	 in	 which	 a	 large	
number	 of	 independent	 repetitions	 of	 an	 identical	 statistical	 experiment	 are	
conducted	 to	 form	 a	 sample	 dataset.	 Probabilities	 for	 each	 possible	 outcome	 are	
calculated	by	dividing	 the	 frequency	of	each	outcome	by	 the	 total	number	of	events	
contained	in	the	dataset.13	The	Frequentist	approach	to	probability	estimation	can	be	
illustrated	using	a	simple	example,	the	flipping	of	an	unbiased	coin,	a	process	that	has	
two	possible	outcomes,	heads	or	tails.	Suppose	we	wish	to	determine	the	probability	
that	 a	 coin	 flip	 will	 result	 in	 a	 head.	 Frequentist	 probability	 tells	 us	 that	 we	 must	
																																								 																				
12	While	consequence	analysis	typically	focuses	on	a	single	impact	measure,	such	as	economic	damage	
expressed	in	dollars	 lost,	there	is	 increasing	acknowledgement	that	 impacts	are	multi-dimensional	and	
should	 therefore	be	addressed	 in	 such	 terms.	See,	 for	 instance:	Bruno	S.	Frey,	Simon	Luechinger,	and	
Alois	Stutzer,	“Calculating	Tragedy:	Assessing	the	Costs	of	Terrorism,”	Journal	of	Economic	Surveys,	21	
(2007):	1-24.	
13	 B.S.	 Everitt	 and	 A.	 Skrondal,	 The	 Cambridge	 Dictionary	 of	 Statistics	 –	 	 4th	 Edition,	 (Cambridge	
University	 Press,	 2010):	 174;	 Alan	 Háyek,	 “‘Mises	 Redux’	 –	 Redux:	 Fifteen	 Arguments	 against	 Finite	
Frequentism,”	 Erkenntnis,	 45	 (1996):	 209-227.	 Please	 note	 that	 our	 designation	 of	 Frequentist	
probability	 could,	 more	 properly,	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 finite	 Frequentist	 probability.	 This	 approach	
demonstrates	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 mathematical	 and	 philosophical	 problems	 as	 an	 interpretation	 of	
probability	despite	its	numerous	enticements	
conduct	a	large	number	of	coin	flips,	measure	the	result	each	time,	and	calculate	the	
share	of	heads	and	tails	for	different	numbers	of	flips:	1	flip,	10	flips,	100	flips,	etc.	The	
results	of	such	an	experiment	are	given	in	Figure	1.	As	the	number	of	flips	 increases,	
the	 proportion	 of	 heads	 approaches	 50	 percent.	 Using	 this	 increasingly	 refined	
experimental	data,	the	probability	of	a	head	resulting	from	the	flip	of	an	unbiased	coin	
is	determined	to	be	50	percent.	
As	illustrated	by	our	simple	example,	a	crucial	issue	in	utilising	Frequentist	probability	
is	 sample	 size.	 From	 Figure	 1	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 results	 based	 on	 a	 single	 flip	would	 be	
misleading.	 In	general,	 the	 larger	 the	 sample	 size,	 the	more	confident	one	can	be	 in	
using	Frequentist	probability	(subject	to	certain	caveats)14.	
In	 risk	 analysis	 there	 is	 often	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 useful	 data	 available	 to	 aid	 in	 the	
evaluation	of	 the	 likelihood	of	a	 scenario,	which	allows	Frequentist	probability	 to	be	
utilised.	For	example,	analysis	of	past	road	traffic	accident	data	shows	that	young	male	
drivers	 are	 disproportionately	 likely	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 accidents	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom.15	This	analysis	relies	on	a	comprehensive	dataset	to	which	Frequentist	tools	
can	be	applied;	 the	probability	of	an	event	occurring	can	be	calculated	directly	 from	
historical	 information.	Various	methods	can	be	employed	to	demonstrate	that,	while	
																																								 																				
14	Ibid.	
15	Alan	F.	Williams	and	Veronika	I.	Shabanova,	“Responsibility	of	drivers,	by	age	and	gender,	for	motor-
vehicle	crash	deaths,”	Journal	of	Safety	Research,	34	(2003):	527.	
Frequentist	 probability	 may	 change	 slightly	 year-to-year,	 the	 overall	 trend	 remains	
fundamentally	 the	 same.	 Consequently,	 young	 male	 drivers,	 who	 are	 a	 greater	
accident	risk	than	other	demographics,	pay	higher	insurance	premiums.	
Frequentist	probability	is	essentially	the	mathematical	description	of	a	sample	dataset	
to	draw	inferences	concerning	the	phenomenon	under	study.	Following	this	approach	
any	 analyst	 provided	 with	 the	 same	 dataset	 and	 utilizing	 the	 same	 analytical	 tools	
would	produce,	in	theory,	identical	results	–	in	this	sense,	Frequentist	probability	may	
be	thought	of	as	objective.16	The	Frequentist	approach	contrasts	with	that	adopted	by	
subjective	Bayesian	probability	which	explicitly	incorporates	analyst	subjectivity.	
In	 general,	 there	 is	 no	 standardised	 process	 for	 generating	 subjective	 Bayesian	
probability	 judgements:	 they	 are	 based	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 assessor	 and	
represent	a	degree	of	belief	 in	the	likelihood	of	occurrence	of	the	event	at	hand.17	In	
cases	where	information	is	limited	and	the	Frequentist	approach	to	probability	cannot	
be	 usefully	 applied,	 as	 the	 data	 set	 is	 too	 small	 to	 be	 representative	 of	 the	
phenomenon	under	study,	for	example,	subjective	Bayesian	approaches	incorporating	
																																								 																				
16	Porter:	Chapter	4.	
17	In	the	context	of	Bayesian	Probability,	the	same	observation	can	be	applied	to	the	generation	of	the	
prior	probability	distribution,	although	there	are	guiding	principles	that	can	be	applied	in	this	case	such	
as	the	Jeffreys	Prior,	see:	D.V.	Lindley,	“The	use	of	prior	probability	distributions	in	statistical	inference	
and	 decisions,”	 in	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Berkeley	 Symposium	 on	 Mathematical	 Statistics	 and	
Probability,	(University	of	California	Press,	1961):	453-468.	
expert	 opinion	 can	 be	 used	 to	 produce	 probabilistic	 judgements.18	 Winkler	 and	
Murphy	 emphasise	 that	 the	 “subjective	 [Bayesian]	 framework	 does	 not	 admit	 the	
existence	 of	 a	 ‘correct’	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	 universal)	 probability.”19	 Instead,	 subjective	
probabilistic	judgements	need	only	be	self-consistent	i.e.	obey	the	laws	of	probability.	
(For	 instance,	 the	probability	across	all	possible	outcomes	of	a	particular	event	must	
sum	to	100	percent.)	As	this	form	of	probabilistic	judgement	relies	on	an	investigator’s	
knowledge	and	prior	beliefs,	an	“individual	making	[a	subjective	Bayesian]	assessment	
will	be	coherent	but	[we]	cannot	force	consensus	between	two	different	analysts”.20	
Mathematically,	 Bayesian	 probability	 is	 a	 procedure	 for	 revising	 and	 updating	
probability	estimates	in	light	of	new	evidence.	This	requires	the	assessor	to	first	specify	
their	 beliefs	 about	 an	 event	 in	 quantitative	 terms	 as	 a	 prior	 probability	 distribution.	
Bayes	Theorem	 is	 then	applied	 to	derive	 the	posterior	probability	distribution	 taking	
into	account	new	evidence	or	data	conditioned	on	this	prior.	This	mathematical	theory	
“has	two	main	elements:	the	use	of	the	laws	of	probability	as	coherence	constraints	on	
rational	 degrees	 of	 belief…and	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 rule	 of	 probabilistic	 inference”	
																																								 																				
18	 Tim	 Bedford	 and	 Roger	 Cooke,	 Probabilistic	 Risk	 Analysis:	 Foundations	 and	 Methods,	 (Cambridge	
University	Press,	2001):	Chapter	10.	
19	 Robert	 L.	 Winkler	 and	 Allan	 H.	 Murphy,	 “‘Good’	 Probability	 Assessors,”	 Journal	 of	 Applied	
Meteorology,	7	(1968):	751.	
20	 George	 Apostolakis,	 “The	 Concept	 of	 Probability	 in	 Safety	 Assessment	 of	 Technological	 Systems,”	
Science,	250	(1990):	1359.	
based	on	the	revision	of	these	rational	degrees	of	belief	using	new	data.21	In	this	paper	
reference	to	the	Bayesian	approach	to	probability	indicates	to	the	former	aspect	of	the	
theory	–	coherence	constraints	on	rational	degrees	of	belief.	For	clarity,	from	this	point	
we	designate	 this	as	 the	subjective	Bayesian	 interpretation	of	probability.	This	 is	 the	
approach	adopted	by	the	quantitative	studies	of	nuclear	terrorism	that	are	considered	
later	in	this	paper.	
It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 interpretations	 of	 probability	 are	 not	 neatly	 divided	 into	
objective	and	subjective	camps.	It	is	uncontroversial	to	note	that	subjectivity	wends	its	
way	 into	 many	 scientific	 activities	 perceived	 as	 being	 objective:	 readers	 with	 an	
interest	 in	 this	 are	 directed	 to	Matthews’	 discussion	 on	 the	 subject	 which,	 in	 part,	
deals	with	subjectivity	in	Frequentist	methods	of	statistical	inference.22	As	one	simple	
example,	 Aven	 et.	 al.	 have	 described	 that	 to	 “define	 the	 frequentist	 probability…we	
have	to	construct	a	population	of	similar	situations.	This	can	however	be	done	in	many	
different	ways.	There	is	no	objective	approach	for	making	this	mental	construction.”23	
Furthermore,	 our	 distinction	 between	 Frequentist	 and	 subjective	 Bayesian	
interpretations	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 with	 a	 view	 to	 expounding	 the	 challenges	 of	
																																								 																				
21	William	Talbott,	“Bayesian	Epistemology,”	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	Winter	(2016).	
22	Robert	A.J.	Matthews,	“Fact	versus	Fiction:	the	Use	and	Abuse	of	Subjectivity	in	Scientific	Research,”	
European	Science	and	Environment	Forum	Working	Paper,	2	(1998).	
23	Terje	Aven,	Ortwin	Renn,	and	Eugene	A.	Rosa,	“On	the	ontological	status	of	the	concept	of	risk,”	
Safety	Science,	49	(2011):	1077.	
probabilistic	 estimation	 relating	 to	 nuclear	 terrorism	 in	 particular.	We	 are	 careful	 to	
work	 only	 with	 subjective	 Bayesian	 interpretations	 as	 defined	 above	 and,	 again,	
emphasise	that	we	do	not	refer	to	the	general	mathematical	Bayesian	interpretation	of	
probability.	
These	 caveats	 aside,	 the	 crucial	 difference	 between	 subjective	 Bayesian	 and	
Frequentist	probability	is	neatly	expressed	by	Goldstein:	“We	have	moved	away	from	a	
traditional	 view	 of	 [Frequentist]	 analysis,	 which	 attempts	 to	 express	 what	 we	 may	
learn	 about	 some	 aspect	 of	 reality	 by	 analysing	 an	 individual	 data	 set.	 Instead,	 the	
[subjective]	Bayesian	analysis	expresses	our	current	state	of	belief	based	on	combining	
information	 from	 the	 data	 in	 question	with	whatever	 other	 knowledge	we	 consider	
relevant.”24	 While	 Frequentist	 probability	 is	 appropriate	 for	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
investigations,	 there	are	many	problems	which	are	not	easily	dealt	with	by	analysing	
past	frequency	of	occurrence	or	through	an	extensive	sampling	process	(as	in	the	case	
of	flipping	a	coin).	Kahneman	and	Tversky	offer	three	pertinent	examples:	“What	are	
the	 chances	 that	 this	 12-year-old	 boy	 will	 grow	 up	 to	 be	 a	 scientist?	 What	 is	 the	
probability	that	this	candidate	will	be	elected	to	office?	What	is	the	likelihood	that	this	
																																								 																				
24	Michael	Goldstein,	“Subjective	Bayesian	Analysis:	Principles	and	Practice,”	Bayesian	Analysis,	1	(2006):	
408.	
company	will	go	out	of	business	[emphasis	added]?”	25	Such	questions	are	effectively	
unique:	 there	 are	 no	 realistic	 datasets	 that	 will	 shed	 light	 on	 such	 questions	 and,	
therefore,	 Frequentist	 tools	 are	 inapplicable.	 These	 are	 cases	 where	 a	 subjective	
Bayesian	approach	to	probability	can	still	enable	quantitative	probabilistic	judgements	
to	be	made,	albeit	subject	to	certain	limitations.	
When	seeking	to	analyse	the	risk	associated	with	a	rare	or	unique	event	for	which	data	
is	either	extremely	limited	or	does	not	exist,	the	subjective	Bayesian	approach	is	often	
adopted.	 Analysts	 provide	 their	 own	 subjective	 Bayesian	 judgement	 concerning	 the	
probability	of	certain	events.	This	analysis	incorporates	a	wide	range	of	data	pertaining	
to	similar	but	ultimately	different	situations.	Probabilities	for	these	similar	events	are	
estimated	 using	 a	 Frequentist	 approach	 and	 are	 used	 to	 create	 what	 Kaplan	 and	
Garrick	 call	 a	 bureau	 of	 standards	 –	 an	 analyst’s	 calibration	 scale	 against	 which	 a	
particular	scenario	can	be	compared.26	Analysts	use	the	bureau	of	standards	as	a	guide	
when	expressing	a	subjective	Bayesian	probability	of	occurrence	for	a	given	scenario.	
However,	 there	 is	no	 formal	process	 for	drawing	upon	 the	bureau	of	 standards	and,	
hence,	the	extent	to	which	different	bureau	components	affect	probability	judgements	
																																								 																				
25	Daniel	Kahneman	and	Amos	Tversky,	“Subjective	Probability:	A	Judgement	of	Representativeness,”	in	
The	Concept	of	Probability	in	Psychological	Experiments,	(D.	Reidel	Publishing	Company,	1974):	44.	
26	Kaplan	and	Garrick:	18.	
will	 vary	 between	 analysts.	 Following	 Kaplan	 and	 Garrick,	 a	 Bayesian	 analysis	 then	
consists	of	two	steps:27	
1. Constructing	a	bureau	of	standards.	A	good	analyst	will	have	high	substantive	
goodness,	that	is,	demonstrable	and	relevant	experience	in	the	domain	in	
which	assessments	are	being	made;28	
2. Drawing	on	the	bureau	of	standards	to	produce	a	probability	estimate.	A	
good	analyst	will	have	high	normative	goodness,	that	is,	expertise	in	
probabilistic	assessment	with	which	to	encode	subjective	assessments	in	a	
coherent	quantitative	manner	that	obeys	the	laws	of	probability.29	
While	normative	goodness	can	be	enhanced	through	expert	calibration	training30,	we	
may	 be	 faced	 with	 a	 scenario	 for	 which	 there	 exists	 no	 relevant	 frequency	 data	 to	
guide	probabilistic	extrapolation.	The	bureau	of	standards	may	be	effectively	empty	or	
the	 data	 contained	 within	 of	 only	 tangential	 relevance	 to	 the	 scenario	 under	
consideration.	An	analyst	will	 therefore	have	 low	substantive	goodness	when	dealing	
with	 such	 a	 scenario.	 This	 crucial	 gulf	 between	 relevant	 frequency	 data	 within	 our	
bureau	of	standards	and	the	scenario	in	which	we	are	expressing	a	degree	of	belief	is	
																																								 																				
27	Ibid.	
28	Winkler	and	Murphy:	752.	
29	Ibid.	
30	Bedford	and	Cooke:	191-217.	
referred	 to	 in	 this	 paper	 as	 the	 knowledge	 gap.31	 Note	 that,	 while	 normative	 and	
substantive	 goodness	 are	 concepts	 taken	 from	 an	 established	 literature,	 the	 term	
knowledge	gap	has	been	coined	here	for	explanatory	purposes.	
For	clarity,	we	make	a	clear	distinction	between	the	notions	of	substantive	goodness	
and	 knowledge	 gap.	 The	 former	 relates	 to	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 assessor	 while	 the	
latter	relates	to	the	scenario	in	question.	A	scenario	with	a	large	knowledge	gap	is	ill-
suited	to	probabilistic	assessment.	Regardless	of	the	qualities	of	the	analyst	the	nature	
of	the	scenario	militates	against	the	formation	of	a	relevant	bureau	of	standards.	It	is	
therefore	 impossible	 for	 any	 analyst	 to	 have	 high	 substantive	 goodness	 in	 such	 a	
context.	 For	 a	 scenario	 with	 a	 large	 knowledge	 gap,	 all	 analysts	 operate	 with	 low	
substantive	goodness.	No	action	on	the	part	of	the	analyst	can	improve	this	situation.		
While	there	are	intrinsic	challenges	in	applying	subjective	Bayesian	methods,	they	have	
been	 successfully	 utilised	 in	 many	 areas,	 for	 example,	 in	 designing	 risk	 prediction	
models	for	treating	common	diseases.32	A	simple	description	of	the	major	differences	
																																								 																				
31	An	alternative	name	for	the	knowledge	gap	could	be	epistemic	goodness,	the	extent	to	which	relevant	
knowledge	about	the	hazard	or	scenario	under	consideration	is	knowable.	
32	Andrew	H.	Briggs,	Ron	Goeree,	Gord	Blackhouse	and	Bernie	J.	O’Brien,	“Probabilistic	Analysis	of	Cost-
Effectiveness	Models:	 Choosing	 between	 Treatment	 Strategies	 for	 Gastroesophageal	 Reflux	 Disease,”	
Medical	Decision	Making,	22	(2002):	291;	Naresh	A.	Dewan,	Christopher	J.	Shehan,	Steven	D.	Reeb,	Lisa	
S.	Gobar,	Walter	 J.	 Scott	and	Kay	Ryschon,	“Likelihood	of	Malignancy	 in	a	Solitary	Pulmonary	Nodule:	
Comparison	of	Bayesian	Analysis	and	Results	of	FDG-PET	Scan,”	Chest,	112	(1997):	416-422.		
between	Frequentist	and	Bayesian	approaches	to	probability	estimation	is	summarised	
below	in	Table	1.	
Subjective	Bayesian	and	Frequentist	Approaches	in	Security	Studies	
Both	 subjective	 Bayesian	 and	 Frequentist	 approaches	 have	 been	 used	 to	 make	
predictions	 within	 the	 field	 of	 security	 studies.	 For	 example,	 Clauset	 et.	 al.	 apply	 a	
Frequentist	 approach	 to	 explore	 the	 severity	 of	 terrorist	 acts.33	 The	 authors	 take	 as	
their	dataset	the	National	Memorial	Institute	for	the	Prevention	of	Terrorism	database	
from	1968	to	2006	containing	approximately	thirty	thousand	acts	of	terrorism.	Eleven	
thousand	of	these	resulted	in	at	least	one	person	being	injured	or	killed.	By	calculating	
frequency-severity	 distributions	 for	 this	 dataset,	 the	 authors	 identify	 a	 “scale	
invariant”	 inverse	 power	 law	 relationship	 between	 the	 frequency	 of	 terrorist	 events	
and	 their	 severity	 in	 terms	 of	 death	 and	 injury.	 The	 strength	 of	 this	 analysis	 and	 its	
applicability	to	future	acts	of	terrorism	rests	on	two	key	assumptions.	Firstly,	that	each	
event	 in	 the	 dataset	 is	 independent	 of	 any	 other,	 as	 required	 by	 the	 Frequentist	
approach.	Analogous	to	the	earlier	coin-flipping	example,	where	 it	was	assumed	that	
each	 flip	 is	 independent	of	 every	other	 flip.	 Secondly,	 that	 the	dataset	 is	 sufficiently	
representative	of	terrorism	as	a	phenomenon.	This	enables	the	authors	to	state,	based	
																																								 																				
33	Aaron	Clauset,	Maxwell	Young,	Kristian	S.	Gleditsch,	“On	the	Frequency	of	Severe	Terrorist	Events,”	
Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution,	51	(2007):	58-87.	
on	their	analysis,	that	there	is	a	“global	pattern	in	the	frequency	statistics	of	terrorist	
attacks”	 characteristic	 of	 terrorism	 itself	 due	 to	 the	 comprehensive	 nature	 of	 their	
underlying	dataset.34		
Given	 the	 complex	 real-world	 problems	 encountered	 in	 security	 studies,	 a	 lack	 of	
directly	 relevant	 data	 can	 often	 pose	 a	 serious	 barrier	 to	 the	 use	 of	 Frequentist	
analysis.	 In	 these	 situations	 subjective	 Bayesian	 approaches	 can	 be	 used	 to	 analyse	
effectively	 unique	 scenarios.	 For	 example,	 they	 have	 been	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	
likelihood	 of	 terrorist	 attacks	 under	 a	 variety	 of	 circumstances	 “when	 existing	
information	is	vague	or	uncertain	yet	may	lead	experts	to	deduce	probabilities	that	can	
later	 be	 updated	 as	 new	 information	 becomes	 available.”35	Mixed	methods	may	 be	
employed	as	the	mathematical	theory	of	Bayesian	probability	“allows	for	incorporation	
of	 subjective	 probability	 judgments	 into	 assessments	 that	 may	 include	 frequentist	
calculations.”36	 However,	 although	 the	 subjective	 Bayesian	 approach	 allows	 for	 the	
incorporation	of	subjective	opinion	when	real-world	data	is	lacking,	care	must	be	taken	
when	 quantitative	 probabilistic	 judgements	 are	 made.	 Some	 analysts	 have	 urged	
caution	 when	 discussing	 the	 role	 subjective	 Bayesian	 probabilities	 have	 played	 in	
predicting	terrorist	threats,	believing	that	these	“should	not	be	discussed	 in	terms	of	
																																								 																				
34	Ibid.:	64.	
35	 Henry	 H.	 Willis,	 Tom	 LaTourrette,	 Terrence	 K.	 Kelly,	 Scot	 Hickey	 and	 Samuel	 Neill,	 Terrorism	 Risk	
Modeling	for	Intelligence	Analysis	and	Infrastructure	Protection,	(RAND,	2007):	5.		
36	Ibid.	
probability	 because	 historical	 data	 does	 not	 exist	 with	 which	 to	 perform	 actuarial	
calculations	of	event	frequencies.”37	
Nuclear	terrorism	as	virtual	risk	
To	date	the	malicious	use	of	nuclear	and	radiological	materials	by	non-state	actors	has	
been	limited	and	there	have	been	no	large-scale	incidences	of	nuclear	terrorism.	As	a	
result	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 adopt	 a	 Frequentist	 approach	 to	 risk	 estimation.	 When	
examining	the	likelihood	of	a	major	terrorist	attack	such	as	the	detonation	of	an	IND	by	
a	 terrorist	 group,	 it	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 consider	 the	 application	 of	 subjective	
Bayesian	methods.	 However,	 as	 emphasised	 above,	 the	 validity	 of	 this	 approach	 for	
the	scenario	under	consideration	hinges	upon	the	size	of	the	knowledge	gap.	 It	must	
be	 possible	 for	 an	 analyst	 to	 construct	 a	 bureau	 of	 standards	with	 high	 substantive	
goodness	 for	 the	 resulting	 probability	 judgements	 to	 be	 anything	 other	 than	 highly	
speculative.	 In	 exploring	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 knowledge	 gap	 for	 nuclear	 terrorism	 it	 is	
illustrative	 to	 draw	 on	 Adams'	 three	 kinds	 of	 risk	 typology	 wherein	 risks	 are	
categorised	as	directly	perceptible,	perceived	through	science,	and	virtual.38	
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Press,	2003):	87-104.	
Directly	 perceptible	 risks	 are	 typically	 managed	 “instinctively	 and	 intuitively”,	
alleviating	 the	 need	 for	 a	 formal	 risk	 assessment.39	 As	 a	 simple	 example,	 when	 a	
person	experiences	hazardous	sensory	input,	the	withdrawal	reflex	attempts	to	arrest	
bodily	 damage	 by	 retreating	 from	 the	 causal	 sensory	 stimuli,	 without	 the	 need	 for	
thought	or	higher	brain	function.	A	second	class	of	risks	are	only	perceptible	thanks	to	
the	 development	 and	 application	 of	 scientific	 theory	 and	 tools,	 requiring	 an	
interpretive	third	party	 (the	scientist)	 to	mediate	the	relationship	between	 individual	
and	hazard	–	these	risks	are	perceived	through	science.	Water-borne	diseases	such	as	
cholera	are	canonical	examples,	being	evidentially	accessible	only	to	medico-scientific	
personnel	 with	 domain-specific	 expertise.40	 Applying	 sophisticated	 statistical	
techniques	 to	 large	volumes	of	pertinent	data,	highly	 trained	 individuals	 can	 identify	
at-risk	sub-communities,	behaviours,	and	paths	to	disease	propagation.	The	collection,	
collation,	 and	 analysis	 of	 data	 clearly	 lies	within	 the	 purview	 of	 technical	 specialists	
although	 the	 implications	 are	 often	 far-reaching	 with	 consequences	 for	 entire	
populations.	 Accordingly,	 the	 evidence-based	 (often	 in	 the	 Frequentist	 sense)	
development	of	policies	to	mitigate	against	disease	outbreak	and	manage	risks	is	often	
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Kindhauser	 (World	 Health	 Organisation,	 2002),	 accessed	 8th	 July,	 2016:	
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placed	 in	the	hands	of	government	agencies	and	the	broader	healthcare	community,	
rather	than	devolved	to	the	individual.41		
A	similar	situation	obtains	 in	 the	security	domain	when	forecasting	risks	arising	 from	
conventional	 terrorism.	 There	 exist	 substantial	 and	 complex	 datasets	 upon	 which	
quantitative	 analysis	 can	 be	 performed	 to	 make	 predictions	 and	 to	 inform	 risk-
minimising	actions	at	the	tactical,	operational,	and	strategic	 levels,	particularly	 in	the	
distribution	of	resources	for	defensive	systems.	For	example,	the	installation	of	metal	
detectors	at	airports	has	been	shown	to	reduce	instances	of	aircraft	hijacking,	although	
the	overall	effect	of	this	policy	is	effectively	neutral	once	substituted	terrorist	activities	
are	taken	into	account.42	While	it	may	appear	obvious	that	metal	detection	technology	
will	 decrease	 hijacking,	 a	 rigorous	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 is	 needed	 to	 determine	
whether	 such	 a	 preventive	 policy	 delivers	 sufficient	 risk-minimising	 value	 compared	
with	alternatives.	The	authority	and	skills	required	to	conduct	such	a	study	are	beyond	
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the	purview	of	officials	at	individual	airports,	and	the	financial,	legislative,	political,	and	
social	 implications	 of	 such	 a	 policy	 generally	 require	 decision-making	 at	 both	 the	
national	and	international	level.43	
Virtual	risks	are	a	final	category	in	this	typology	and	are	characterised	by	a	paucity	of	
data	–	it	is	not	possible	to	claim	to	have	sufficient	information	to	meaningfully	ascribe	
probabilities	 and,	 as	 such,	 no	 analyst	 can	 attain	 high	 substantive	 goodness.	 The	
knowledge	 gap	 between	 calibration	 data	 and	 the	 event	 in	 which	 an	 analyst	 is	
expressing	a	degree	of	belief	 is	 simply	 too	great.	 In	 comparison	with	 risks	perceived	
through	 science,	 the	 critical	 difference	 is	 the	 size	 of	 the	 knowledge	 gap,	 which	 is	
considerably	 larger	 for	 virtual	 risks.	 A	 characteristic	 example	 of	 a	 virtual	 risk	 is	 the	
invasion	 of	 the	 Earth	 by	 hostile	 aliens.	 Famously,	 American	 astronomer	 Frank	Drake	
proposed	 his	 eponymous	 equation	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	which,	 through	 a	 probabilistic	
argument,	 has	 “helped	 guide	 speculation	 about	 the	 likelihood	 of	 intelligent	 extra-
terrestrial	life”	contacting	humanity.44	However,	extant	frequency	data	is	non-existent.	
No	 analyst	 could	 make	 a	 meaningful	 judgement	 about	 this	 risk	 because,	 from	
humanity’s	current	vantage,	the	relevant	data	 is	 (currently)	unknowable.	 Information	
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is	 increasingly	available	concerning	 the	existence	of	planets	outside	 the	solar	 system	
that	could,	in	theory,	support	life	and	some	scientists	have	attempted	to	quantify	the	
likelihood	of	existence	of	intelligent	extra-terrestrials.	However,	even	with	access	to	a	
comprehensive	catalogue	of	life-supporting	planets	throughout	the	galaxy,	there	exists	
no	 precise	 way	 of	 estimating	 whether	 they	 are	 populated	 by	 intelligent	 beings,	 let	
alone	 whether	 such	 beings	 could	 cross	 the	 vastness	 of	 space	 should	 they	 actually	
exist.45	 If	 such	an	estimate	 could	be	made,	we	would	 still	 lack	 a	 crucial	 piece	of	 the	
puzzle:	are	the	intentions	of	the	alien	species	likely	to	be	malign?	Even	with	a	means	of	
estimating	 the	 distribution	 of	 intelligent	 life	 across	 the	 galaxy,	 any	 statement	
concerning	the	alien’s	attitude	towards	humanity	can	be	nothing	but	highly	speculative	
without	 additional	 sources	 of	 data.	 The	 large	 numbers	 of	 unknowns	 in	 this	 case	
militate	 against	 the	 formation	 of	 a	meaningful	 quantitative	 likelihood	 estimate	 and,	
hence,	there	is	“no	realistic	way	to	evaluate	one	prediction	against	another.”46	
Virtual	 risks	 are	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 analyse	 and	 any	 attempt	 at	 quantification	
represents	ungrounded	numerical	speculation.	As	Adams	makes	clear,	for	virtual	risks	
the	 “veneer	 of	 scientific	 authority	 imparted	 by	 quantified	 probability	 often	 can	
withstand	 little	 scratching.”47	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 stop	 analysts	 from	
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conducting	numerical	analysis,	drawing	on	what	little	prior	knowledge	and	experience	
may	be	available.		Numerical	assessment	of	virtual	risks	is	likely	to	be	characterised	by	
strong	 disagreement	 amongst	 analysts	 resulting	 from	 the	 considerable	 extrapolation	
from	 incomplete	 or	 partially	 relevant	 data.	 According	 to	 Adams	 it	 is	 common	 for	
“reputable	 scientists	 [and	 analysts	 to]	 contend	 with	 one	 another.”48	 	 Estimates	
produced	diverge	to	the	point	that	a	coherent	picture	regarding	purported	risks	cannot	
be	divined	and	“convictions,	prejudices,	and	superstitions”	form	the	basis	for	analysis.	
49	 If	 quantitative	 tools	 are	 applied,	 this	 disagreement	 will	 manifest	 in	 significant	
disparities	between	and	understandings	of	numerical	estimates.	
Under	Adams’	typology	nuclear	terrorism	fits	squarely	within	the	virtual	risk	category.	
In	terms	of	prior	experience	there	are	no	 large-scale	 incidences	upon	which	to	draw.	
Although	 relevant	 information	 does	 exist,	 this	 is	 often	 limited,	 incomplete,	 open	 to	
interpretation,	 or	 only	 applicable	 to	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 overall	 puzzle.	 For	 example,	
when	 considering	 whether	 a	 terrorist	 group	 could	 acquire	 nuclear	 material,	 an	
essential	 part	 of	many	 nuclear	 terrorism	 scenarios,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 consider	 past	
thefts.	Here,	though,	there	are	just	a	handful	of	malicious	cases	in	the	public	domain	
upon	 which	 to	 draw	 in	 analysing	 precisely	 how	 nuclear	materials	 can	 be	 stolen,	 an	
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activity	about	which	it	is	difficult	to	generalise	due	to	the	diversity	of	states,	facilities,	
measures,	 materials,	 and	 actors	 involved.	 This	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 detail	 limits	 the	
calibration	 of	 probability	 estimates	 regarding	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 potential	
adversaries.50		
Nevertheless,	attempts	to	deduce	probabilities	either	directly	from	or	referencing	the	
historical	record	are	not	uncommon.	A	widely	read	study	by	Matthew	Bunn	illustrates	
these	 issues	 clearly	while	 offering	 a	 nuanced	understanding	of	 the	 challenges	 facing	
analysts	engaging	in	numerical	assessment.	Bunn	assesses	the	probability	of	a	terrorist	
group	choosing	to	pursue	black	market	acquisition	of	nuclear	material	as	“fairly	large”,	
equating	 to	 around	 a	 30%	 annual	 likelihood,	 and	 assigns	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 group	
being	 successful	 in	 an	 attempt	 at	 20%.51	 These	 estimates	 are	 based	 upon	 the	
observation	 that	 “[b]oth	 Aum	 Shinrikyo	 and	 al	 Qaeda	 have	 pursued	 this	method	 of	
acquisition.”52	In	this	case	the	bureau	of	standards	is	extremely	limited,	compromising	
just	 two	 groups,	 neither	 of	which	were	 successful	 in	 procuring	 nuclear	material	 –	 a	
limitation	acknowledged	by	the	author.		
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Assessing	 terrorist	 intentions	 to	 carry	 out	 acts	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 is	 similarly	
challenging.	While	some	analysts	point	to	terrorist	statements	regarding	Weapons	of	
Mass	Destruction,	others	pass	this	off	as	empty	rhetoric,	arguing	that	the	same	groups	
will	 be	 deterred	 from	 acquiring	 and	 using	 such	weapons	 for	 fear	 of	 alienating	 their	
political	base,	diminishing	their	meagre	financial	resources,	and	risking	their	long-term	
survival	 through	 reprisal	 action	by	 the	 states	 they	 target.53	These	 statements	 cannot	
be	 interpreted	 in	 an	 unambiguous	 manner	 and	 offer	 scant	 basis	 for	 numerical	
reasoning.	
Efforts	to	Quantify	the	Risk	of	Nuclear	Terrorism		
Despite	 intrinsic	 challenges	 in	 assessing	 the	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 a	 substantial	
literature	 has	 developed	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 driven	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 “the	
danger	of	high-end	terrorism	 is	growing.”54	Analysts	such	as	Brian	 Jenkins’	observe	a	
shift	 in	 terrorist	strategy:	 formerly	 terrorists	wanted	“a	 lot	of	people	watching,	not	a	
lot	of	people	dead…[whereas	increasingly]	terrorists	want	a	lot	of	people	watching	and	
a	lot	of	people	dead.”55	The	geographical	spread	of	nuclear	materials	and	expertise	has	
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also	 increased	which,	 in	the	eyes	of	many,	has	served	to	 lower	the	technical	barriers	
groups	would	have	to	overcome	to	perform	acts	of	nuclear	terror.56	
Contemporary	 studies	 are	 largely	 focused	 on	 providing	 a	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 the	
relative	 risk	between	different	options	open	 to	 terrorist	groups.57	Some	of	 these	are	
generic,	 while	 others	 focus	 on	 the	 intentions	 and	 efforts	 made	 by	 specific	 terrorist	
groups.58		Also	commonly	explored	are	psychological	factors	and	structural	aspects	of	
groups	that	might	pursue	nuclear	terrorism,	the	routes	they	might	take,	and	how	they	
could	be	 thwarted.59	Within	 this	 literature	 there	 is	 a	 clear	division	between	analysts	
that	believe	an	act	of	nuclear	terrorism	to	be	an	imminent	threat	and	those	who	see	
such	 an	 attack	 as	 a	 highly	 unlikely	 event.	 Heated	 exchanges	 between	 scholars	 from	
both	ends	of	this	spectrum	have	arguably	served	to	polarise	this	field,	contributing	to	
an	 impasse	 within	 the	 analytical	 community.60	 Numerical	 estimates	 have	 been	
mobilised	 in	 support	 of	 different	 viewpoints,	with	 Allison	 and	Mueller	 assessing	 the	
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60	 After	 receiving	 criticism	 for	 “alarmist”	 views	 on	 the	 issue,	 Peter	 Zimmerman	 famously	 included	 a	
section	 headed	 John	 Mueller:	 Pollyanna?	 in	 his	 2009	 paper	 “Do	 We	 Really	 Need	 to	 Worry?	 Some	
Reflections	on	the	Threat	of	Nuclear	Terrorism.”	 In	Achieving	Nuclear	Ambitions:	Scientists,	Politicians,	
and	Proliferation,	Jacques	Hymans	notes	that	Allison	“cites	–	without	irony	–	an	analysis	conducted	by	
science	fiction	writer	Tom	Clancy”	as	part	of	an	argument	showing	terrorists	or	even	 individuals	could	
self-produce	fissile	materials	for	inclusion	in	an	IND.	
annual	likelihood	of	nuclear	terrorism	as	“more	likely	than	not”	(i.e.	upwards	of	one	in	
two)	and	more	than	one	in	three	billion,	respectively.61		
In	modelling	 terrorism	 and,	 in	 particular,	 nuclear	 terrorism,	 event	 tree	models	 have	
been	widely	utilised.	This	conceptually	simple	method	has	been	applied	to	assess	the	
reliability	 of	 nuclear	 reactors	 and	 is	 commonly	 used	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Probabilistic	
Safety	 Analysis	 or	 Probabilistic	 Risk	 Analysis	 for	 large	 engineering	 projects.62	 The	
development	 of	 probabilistic	 tools	 for	 risk	 analysis	 and	 their	 application	 to	 nuclear	
engineering	 has	 a	 long	 and	 complex	 history	 which	 has	 reflexively	 shaped	 nuclear	
safety,	a	process	culminating	in	the	famed	1975	WASH-1400	study.63	When	applied	to	
terrorism,	a	group’s	behaviour	is	broken	down	into	a	sequence	of	actions	or	decisions,	
each	of	which	has	an	associated	probability.	An	initiating	event,	often	the	decision	of	a	
terrorist	 group	 to	undertake	an	attack,	 is	 followed	by	all	 possible	 realisations	of	 this	
decision	 point	 and	 all	 subsequent	 contributory	 decisions	 laid	 out	 in	 a	 sequence	 or	
tree.64	Each	tree	ends	at	a	terminal	event;	in	the	case	of	nuclear	terrorism	this	could	be	
the	 successful	 detonation	 of	 an	 IND.	 As	 “the	 probability	 of	 each	 event	 is	 displayed	
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conditional	on	the	occurrence	of	events	that	precede	it	in	the	tree,	the	joint	probability	
of	 the	intersection	 of	 events	 that	 constitute	 a	 sequence	 (or	 “scenario”)	 is	 found	 by	
multiplication”	along	 the	 sequence	 in	 question.65	 This	 is	 a	 trivial	 calculation	 which	
further	 supports	 the	 widespread	 application	 of	 event	 tree	 models	 by	 limiting	 their	
technical	content.	Event	trees	have	been	the	subject	of	intense	academic	study	and	a	
growing	 literature	 concerning	 their	 construction	 and	 operation	 is	 now	 available	 and	
accessible	to	the	lay	reader.66		
In	the	context	of	nuclear	terrorism,	an	attack	scenario	is	broken	down	into	constituent	
sequential	steps.	These	are	then	analysed	from	the	perspective	of	the	adversary,	with	
the	probability	of	a	terrorist	group	completing	each	step	considered	 in	turn.67	A	sub-
set	of	 these	 steps	might	 include	an	 insider	 first	defeating	 facility	 security	 systems	 to	
acquire	nuclear	material,	bypassing	detection	systems	to	 illicitly	 remove	the	material	
from	 the	 facility,	 and	 overcoming	 technical	 challenges	 to	 fabricate	 a	 viable	 device,	
before	transporting	the	device	to	a	target,	and	successfully	detonating.	The	probability	
of	this	scenario	occurring	 is	determined	by	multiplying	the	probabilities	of	success	of	
each	sequential	step	along	a	given	tree,	from	the	initiator	to	the	terminus.	
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67	Bunn:	104-106;	Mueller:	14.	Levi	stands	in	contrast	to	this	approach,	for	example,	by	analysing	the	set	
of	defensive	measures	as	a	whole,	i.e.	as	a	layered	defensive	system.	
In	 the	 aforementioned	 study	 carried	 out	 by	 Bunn,	 an	 event-tree	 model	 is	 used	 to	
explore	the	risk	of	nuclear	terrorism,	“mak[ing]	explicit	the	assumptions	about	the	key	
factors	 affecting	 the	 risk	 and	 provid[ing]	 a	 tool	 for	 assessing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
alternative	policies.”68	It	estimates	the	global	likelihood	of	an	act	of	nuclear	terrorism	
as	 “29	 percent	 probability…in	 the	 next	 decade”	 and	 identifies	 the	 security	 of	 fissile	
material	as	a	key	chokepoint	upon	which	policy	efforts	should	be	focused.69		
However,	 despite	 their	 conceptual	 and	 operational	 simplicity,	 there	 are	 serious	
problems	with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 event-tree	models	 have	 been	 applied	 to	 terrorism	
and,	 in	 particular,	 nuclear	 terrorism.	 These	 stem	 largely	 from	 the	way	 they	 serve	 to	
simplify	 terrorist	 group’s	 decision-making	 processes,	 failing	 to	 treat	 terrorists	 as	
intelligent	 and	 adaptive	 adversaries,	 with	 probabilities	 regarding	 group	 behaviour	
required	as	model	 inputs	as	opposed	 to	outputs.	These	weaknesses	are	discussed	 in	
more	detail	below.	
Terrorists	are	intelligent	and	adaptive	
Event	 trees	 were	 designed	 to	 study	 large	 engineering	 projects	 incorporating	 many	
interdependent	physical	components.	While	this	type	of	system	may	be	complicated	in	
structure,	 the	 relevant	 characteristics	 of	 individual	 components	 (for	 example,	 failure	
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rates)	 can	be	 readily	 described	by	 static	 probability	 distributions	 and	easily	 encoded	
into	 the	 relevant	 event	 tree	branches.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case	when	describing	 terrorist	
decision-making,	which	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process	wherein	 groups	 adapt	 their	 tactics	 and	
strategy	in	response	to	various	external	and	internal	stimuli,	such	as	the	introduction	
of	 new	 security	 measures	 by	 state	 adversaries	 or	 changes	 in	 the	 makeup	 of	 group	
leadership,	 respectively.	 Studies	 have	 shown	 that	 terrorist	 groups	 “learn	 from	
experience,	 adapting	 their	 strategies	 and	 practices	 in	 response	 to	 information	 and	
feedback.”70	 In	 the	 case	 of	 hijacking,	 terrorist	 groups	 responded	 to	metal	 detection	
systems	at	airports	by	substituting	their	activities	for	others,	such	as	increased	hostage	
taking	 and	 assassination	 attempts,	 which	 ultimately	 proved	 as	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	
civilian	 lives	 lost.71	 This	 is	 problematic	 not	 least	 because,	 from	 a	 decision-makers	
perspective,	understanding	both	intended	and	unintended	impacts	of	different	choices	
is	essential	in	the	evaluation	of	any	potential	policy	change.	
A	characteristic	example	in	the	domain	of	nuclear	security	is	the	installation	of	border	
monitoring	 systems	 designed	 to	 detect	 nuclear	 and	 radiological	materials	 outside	 of	
regulatory	 control.	 The	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 system	 will	 impact	 upon	 the	 nascent	
trafficker’s	 decision	 to	 illicitly	 transport	 materials	 across	 detector-enabled	 borders,	
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particularly	 if	 attention	 is	 drawn	 to	 the	 existence	 and	 capabilities	 of	 deployed	
systems.72	Effective	modelling	tools	should	recognise	the	responsive	nature	of	terrorist	
or	 criminal	 groups	 to	 this	 information	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 adapt	 dynamically	 to	 a	
changing	 environment.73	 Modelling	 efforts	 to	 assess	 the	 probability	 of	 nuclear	
terrorism,	 and	 those	 utilising	 event-trees	 in	 particular,	 have	 not	 incorporated	 this	
essential	 dynamic	 component	 accounting	 for	 the	 interplay	 between	 terrorist	 groups	
and	 their	 adversaries.	 Bunn	 clearly	 acknowledges	 this	 difficulty	 in	 his	 study,	 stating	
that	“intelligent	and	adaptive	adversaries	may	react	to	security	upgrades	not	by	giving	
up	but	by	 increasing	 their	 capabilities.”	However,	 this	action-reaction	dynamic	 is	not	
captured	by	the	model	employed	as	this	functionality	is	largely	absent	from	the	basic	
event	tree	modelling	toolkit.74	
Probabilities	regarding	terrorist	behaviour	should	be	model	outputs,	not	inputs	
Numerical	 estimates	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 typically	 ascribe	
probabilities	 to	 the	 decision	 to	 engage	 in	 an	 act	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 and	 the	 likely	
success	of	such	an	endeavour.	Considered	through	the	event	 tree	 lens,	 this	situation	
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applies	 to	 each	 step	 of	 the	 nuclear	 terror	 process.	 When	 determining	 these	
probabilities,	subject	matter	experts	are	currently	required	to	predict	how	adversaries	
will	behave	a	priori,	providing	such	figures	as	model	inputs.	As	emphasised	by	the	US	
National	Research	Council	 in	their	report	on	the	misapplication	of	event	tree	analysis	
in	the	bioterrorism	domain,	for	this	approach	to	be	valid	“the	subject-matter	experts	
must	grasp	nuances	of	alternatives	and	outcomes	and	render	opinions	founded	on	an	
analysis	of	the	entire	decision	process”	of	a	terrorist	group.75	For	an	analyst	making	a	
probabilistic	assessment,	an	event	tree	thus	presents	a	problem:	in	order	to	assess	the	
behaviour	 of	 the	 group	 at	 each	 step	 it	 is	 currently	 necessary	 to	 take	 account	 of	 the	
entire	decision-making	process	of	the	group,	including	scenario-specific	tactical	choices	
and	broader	strategic	intentions.	However,	the	insights	into	the	entire	decision-making	
process	of	nuclear	terrorist	groups	are	precisely	the	desired	outputs	of	the	modelling	
efforts	themselves.	
For	example,	to	assess	the	probability	of	a	terrorist	group	successfully	procuring	fissile	
material	through	a	specified	channel	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	group’s	overall	
strategy	regarding	their	planned	act	of	nuclear	terror.	Given	the	significant	resources	
that	must	be	accorded	 to	a	nuclear	 terrorist	endeavour,	 any	group	engaging	 in	 such	
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activity	may	well	formulate	a	clear	(albeit	malleable)	plan	of	action,	taking	into	account	
their	own	capabilities,	 the	barriers	 they	will	 face,	 their	 strategic	aims,	and	 their	own	
perceptions	 regarding	 success	 or	 failure.	 This	 analysis,	 fully	 synthesised,	 will	 form	 a	
basis	 for	 the	 plan	 of	 action	 a	 group	 will	 likely	 adopt	 which	 will	 guide	 subsequent	
behaviour.	This	leads	to	the	aforementioned	logical	inconsistency	in	the	application	of	
event	 tree	 models:	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 probability	 of,	 say,	 a	 terrorist	 group	
attempting	 to	 acquire	 fissile	 material	 through	 the	 black	 market,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
understand	 the	 group’s	 broader	 strategy	 pertaining	 to	 acts	 of	 nuclear	 terror,	 which	
itself	 is	exactly	what	 the	model	attempts	 to	determine.	As	 the	US	National	Research	
Council	 study	makes	 clear,	 “[f]or	 decision	 problems	 as	 complex	 as	 those	motivating	
[this	study],	the	assessment	of	the	probabilities	that	adversaries	will	choose	courses	of	
action	should	be	the	outputs	of	analysis,	not	required	input	parameters.”76	
Event	trees	overly	simplify	nuclear	terrorism	
Event	tree	models	are	overly	prescriptive	in	structural	terms	to	the	point	at	which	their	
use	 militates	 against	 a	 realistic	 representation	 of	 terrorist	 behaviour.	 Between	 the	
initiator-terminus	extremes,	events	are	laid	out	in	a	linear	chain	with	a	prescribed	and	
non-negotiable	ordering.	This	 rigidity	goes	against	 the	evidence	available	 in	both	 the	
nuclear	 terror	 domain	 and	 in	 broader	 discussions	 of	 highly	 engineered	 systems	
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designed	 and	produced	by	 illicit	 groups.	 That	 terrorists	will	 undertake	 a	 clear,	 linear	
chain	of	actions	to	achieve	their	goals	is	an	a	priori	assumption	that	is	not	compatible	
with	 available	 albeit	 limited	 evidence.77	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 terrorist	 groups	
operate	without	 a	 clear	 overarching	 strategy.	 Rather,	 it	 suggests	 that	 strategic	 aims	
can	be	fulfilled	in	a	nonlinear	way,	and	that	the	best-laid	plans	often	go	awry.	
In	 the	 application	 of	 event-trees,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 terrorist	 groups	 that	 would	
pursue	 nuclear	 terrorism	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 generic.	 This	 is	 an	 unrealistic	
simplification	highlighted	by	Levi	who	makes	clear	that	“[r]ather	than	assuming	a	single	
model	of	skill	and	capability	building,	an	intelligent	defensive	strategy	will	prepare	to	
take	advantage	of	a	wide	range	of	terrorist	approaches.”78	This	statement	is	reinforced	
by	a	cursory	examination	of	two	high-profile	groups	that	have	in	the	past	considered	
the	possibility	of	 nuclear	 terrorism,	Aum	Shinrikyo	 (now	defunct)	 and	Al-Qaeda.	 The	
former,	 a	 doomsday	 cult,	 was	 based	 largely	 in	 a	 first	 world	 country	 with	 attendant	
security	and	 intelligence	services79;	the	 latter	operates	transnationally,	 in	some	cases	
in	fragmented	states	without	effective	security	forces,	at	other	times	receiving	direct	
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state	 support.80	 These	 two	 groups	 and	 others	willing	 to	 engage	 in	 nuclear	 terrorism	
differ	 significantly	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 aims,	 motivations,	 structures,	 financial	
arrangements,	 and	 openness	 to	 external	 influence,	 and	 so	 warrant	 a	 distinct	
assessment	taking	these	differences	into	account.		
This	 situation	 obtains	 in	 numerous	 quantitative	 studies	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism.	 For	
instance,	 in	 one	 survey-based	 study,	 75%	of	 respondents	 reported	 the	 black	market	
route	 as	 the	 most	 likely	 pathway	 for	 terrorist	 acquisition	 of	 nuclear	 material.81	
However,	this	judgement	of	terrorist	group	behaviour	is	conditional	upon	a	wide	range	
of	 group-	 and	 scenario-specific	 assumptions	 and	 factors,	 none	 of	 which	 are	 made	
explicit	 in	 the	 analysis,	which	 thus	 renders	 the	 figure	meaningless	 as	 a	descriptor	of	
terrorist	behaviour.	
Risk	models	and	nuclear	terrorism:	a	new	perspective	
The	 preceding	 sections	 outline	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 numerical	 risk	
assessments	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism.	 	 Efforts	 to	 date	 are	 centred	 on	 overly	 simplistic	
models	which	fail	to	take	account	of	terrorist	intelligence	and	adaptation	in	response	
to	 measures	 designed	 to	 mitigate	 the	 risks	 of	 terrorism,	 and	 offer	 wildly	 divergent	
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predictions.	 In	 operation,	 model	 input	 requirements	 demand	 analysts	 to	 make	
judgements	 of	 terrorist	 behaviour	 that,	 themselves,	 should	 be	 the	 output	 of	 well-
defined	modelling	processes.	However,	by	adopting	an	alternative	perspective	on	the	
utility	 of	 risk	 modelling	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 obtain	 useful	 insights	 relating	 to	 nuclear	
terrorism.	
Conventional	wisdom	suggests	that	modelling	has	two	purposes,	to	explain	or	predict	
some	portion	of	the	real	world.82	Probabilistic	risk	models	are	predictive	 in	that	they	
attempt	 to	anticipate	 future	events.	Those	negative	events	considered	most	 likely	 to	
occur	 become	 the	 focus	 for	measures	 designed	 either	 to	 diminish	 the	 likelihood	 of	
occurrence	or	to	mitigate	negative	consequences.	This	has	been	the	case	to	date	when	
modelling	nuclear	terrorism,	with	emphasis	placed	on	determining	probabilities	for	the	
purpose	of	policy	 formation.	 	 The	 crucial	 obstacle	here	 is	 that	nuclear	 terrorism	 is	 a	
virtual	 risk	 and,	 therefore,	 attempts	 to	 apply	 subjective	 Bayesian	 probabilistic	
estimates	are	 subject	 to	a	 large	knowledge	gap.	However,	models	 can	perform	a	 far	
wider	range	of	roles	beyond	these	two	basic	functions.83	Amongst	this	panoply	are	two	
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connected	 function,	 to	 structure	 thinking	 and	 to	 provide	 a	 locus	 for	 discussion	
amongst	relevant	stakeholders.84			
Models	to	structure	thinking	
Models	 offer	 a	 formal	 environment	 to	 structure	 thinking.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 nuclear	
terrorism,	 they	 allow	 analysts	 to	make	 a	 range	 of	 simplifying	 assumptions	 such	 that	
important	characteristics	of	terrorist	behaviour	become	amenable	to	investigation.	By	
codifying	 these	 steps	 mathematically	 a	 formal	 model	 can	 “make	 explicit	 the	
assumptions	about	the	key	factors	affecting	the	risk”,	offering	the	analyst	a	framework	
in	which	to	operate.85	The	model	is	“itself	the	starting	point	for	future	discussion	and	
hence	 shapes	 those	 discussions,”	 acting	 as	 a	 medium	 through	 which	 analysis	 can	
occur.86	 As	 Pate-Cornell	 observes	 in	 the	 context	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism:	 “Because	 we	
illustrate	 our	model	 using	 fictitious	 numbers,	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 work	 is	 not	 so	
much	in	the	specific	ranking	of	countermeasures	that	it	suggests	as	in	the	framework	
for	reasoning	that	it	provides.”87	As	the	‘numbers’	inputted	into	any	model	of	nuclear	
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terrorism	will	be	‘fictitious’	in	the	sense	that	nuclear	terrorism	is	a	virtual	risk,	this	is	a	
positive	way	of	utilising	models	developed	to	date.		
For	example,	Bunn’s	model	has	been	highly	 influential	 in	 this	 respect.	By	adopting	a	
supply-chain	 perspective	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism,	 with	 the	 attendant	 breakdown	 of	
terrorist	decision-making	into	a	linear	chain,	the	model	focuses	the	analyst’s	attention	
on	the	different	options	open	to	terrorist	groups.	These	are	explicitly	 linked	to	policy	
options	 that	may	decrease	 the	 likelihood	of	acquisition	of	nuclear	weapons	or	 fissile	
material.	The	power	of	this	approach	 is	that	“by	breaking	a	 large,	and	at	first	glance,	
intractable	question	 into	a	 series	of	 smaller	 individual	questions,	an	estimate	can	be	
obtained	 for	 the	 overall	 question.”88	 This	 is	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 debate,	
which	both	emphasises	the	importance	of	policy-relevant	contributions	and	legitimises	
investigation	into	this	contentious	subject.	This	is,	of	course,	subject	to	the	proviso	that	
model	outputs	are	not	 treated	as	 inviolable	and	 that	analysts	utilising	 such	methods	
acknowledge	this	essential	truism.	
Risk	models	as	loci	of	discussion	
Modelling	 can	 catalyse	 stakeholder	 community	 engagement	 with	 a	 topic	 of	
investigation	 in	a	 shared	manner,	with	models	 “focusing	debate	and	highlighting	 the	
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basis	 for	 disagreements.”89	 In	 the	 domain	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism,	 assessments	 have	
typically	 been	 carried	 out	 by	 individual	 analysts,	 while	 group	 efforts	 to	 determine	
likelihoods	have	focused	on	simplistic	elicitation	of	overall	probabilities.90		
These	 two	 approaches	 can	 be	 brought	 together	 through	 the	 shared	 utilisation	 of	
probabilistic	 models.	 This	 can	 “tame	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 domain…enabl[ing]	
stakeholders	 to	 jointly	 explore	 relevant	 concepts,	 data,	 system	 dynamics,	 policy	
options,	 and	 the	 assessment	 of	 potential	 consequences	 of	 policy	 options,	 in	 a	
structured	 and	 shared	 way.”91	 Areas	 of	 both	 agreement	 and	 disagreement	 can	 be	
identified	through	this	process	which,	in	turn,	sets	an	agenda	for	future	research	in	the	
nuclear	 terrorism	 domain	 to	 determine	 why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 Identifying	 areas	 of	
agreement	allows	for	the	simultaneous	identification	of	relevant	evidence	(the	bureau	
of	standards)	and	scrutiny	of	extant	policy	advice.	By	contrast,	areas	of	disagreement	
can	be	investigated	further	so	that	the	underlying	reasons	for	divergent	views	can	be	
clearly	 understood.	 Evidence	 used	 in	 support	 of	 divergent	 views	 can	 be	 critically	
considered	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 possible	 credible	 perspectives	
undertaken,	again	with	a	view	to	establishing	whether	extant	policy	advice	has	been	
well-rendered.	
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Bunn	 has	 partially	 argued	 for	 an	 approach	 of	 this	 kind,	 encouraging	 readers	 who	
“disagree	with	some	of	the	numbers…to	use	the	model	with	numbers	of	their	own,	to	
develop	and	analyze	their	own	risk	assessments.”92	The	crucial	subsequent	step	 is	 to	
critically	analyse	the	results	of	this	activity	across	the	expert	community.	According	to	
Kaplan	and	Garrick,	 shared	background	knowledge	 is	 key	 to	 consistent	and	mutually	
intelligible	 risk	assessment93;	policy	makers	 seeking	advice	on	nuclear	 terrorism	 risks	
would	 do	well	 to	 note	 that	members	 of	 the	 nuclear	 terrorism	 analytical	 community	
themselves	do	not	expect	anything	approaching	agreement	when	discussing	numerical	
risk	assessment	of	nuclear	terror	events.	Understanding	the	extent	of	and	reasons	for	
this	divergence	 is	 thus	an	essential	activity	 in	which	modelling	can	play	an	 important	
role.	
How	to	use	risk	models	
Accepting	 the	 notion	 that	 models	 can	 act	 as	 a	 structured	 locus	 for	 discussion,	 it	 is	
natural	 to	 ask	 precisely	 how	 to	 use	 a	 model	 in	 this	 way.	 Fortunately,	 established	
methods	already	exist	–	when	assessing	the	risk	of	events	with	low	occurrence	rates	or	
for	 which	 adequate	 data	 is	 unavailable	 recourse	 to	 expert	 opinion	 for	 probabilistic	
estimation	is	a	well-studied	activity.	
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When	considering	nuclear	terrorism,	the	most	important	component	of	these	methods	
is	the	explicit	use	of	expert	groups	rather	than	individuals.	This	observation	stems	from	
the	belief	 that	“expertise	 is	unlikely	 to	reside	 in	a	single	expert.”94	Efforts	 to	date	by	
individuals	are	essentially	expert	self-elicitation	exercises,	in	which	no	attempt	is	made	
to	 canvass	 opinion	 widely	 and	 hence	 control	 for	 inevitable	 personal	 bias	 in	
probabilistic	estimation.	
As	 for	 the	 form	 risk	models	might	 take,	 extending	 them	 beyond	 static	 event	 chains	
could	 allow	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 more	 complex	 feedback	 and	 response	
mechanisms,	 and	 the	 explicit	 inclusion	 of	 dynamic	 policy	 choices	 and	 adversary	
behaviour.	 For	 example,	 the	 formalism	 offered	 by	 State-Transition	models	 or	 (semi-
)Markov	 decision	 processes	 incorporate	 multiple	 states	 with	 associated	 transition	
probabilities,	 subject	 to	a	 range	of	policy	choices	 in	 the	case	of	 the	 latter	–	different	
policies	 result	 in	 different	 transition	 probabilities.95	 This	 may	 offer	 a	 more	 realistic	
alternative	 to	static	and	 linear	event	chains	although,	 to	date,	 the	specifics	have	not	
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been	investigated	in	the	risk	assessment	or	terrorism	context	beyond	a	small	number	
of	speculative	studies.96	
Another	potential	avenue	of	investigation	would	involve	treating	an	event	tree	model	
as	a	tool	for	classifying	key	decision	points	in	terrorist	behaviour,	and	then	applying	a	
range	 of	 alternative	 modelling	 techniques	 to	 the	 study	 of	 each.	 This	 approach	
acknowledges	 that	 different	 elements	 of	 terrorist	 nuclear	 weapon	 development	 are	
best	 modelled	 individually.	 For	 example,	 in	 modelling	 nuclear	 material	 acquisition,	
significant	 effort	 has	 been	 expended	 in	 modelling	 non-nuclear	 black	 and	 parallel	
markets.	A	number	of	modelling	techniques	or	(in)formal	analogies	could	be	explored	
to	aid	in	the	determination	of	key	parameters	for	black	market	acquisition	of	nuclear	
material.	 In	 this	 sense,	 an	 event	 tree	 model	 classifies	 events	 which	 can	 then	 be	
investigated	 in	 a	 multitude	 of	 different	 ways	 as	 befits	 their	 unique	 characteristics,	
offering	 a	 framework	 under	 which	 outputs	 of	 these	 different	 approaches	 can	 be	
brought	together	to	investigate	the	larger	problem	under	consideration.	Crucially,	this	
could	alleviate	the	criticism	of	event	tree	modelling	applied	to	nuclear	terrorism	arising	
from	 the	US	National	Research	Council	 study	 into	bioterrorism	 risk	 assessment,	 that	
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analysts	 are	 required	 to	 input	 probabilities	 that	 themselves	 should	be	 the	output	 of	
modelling	efforts	into	event	tree	models.97	
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	stress	 that	 the	above	discussion	should	be	caveated	by	 the	
intrinsic	challenges	in	formalising	a	process	as	complex	as	nuclear	terrorism.	Capturing	
this	 within	 any	 kind	 of	 mathematical	 model	 may	 serve	 to	 shape	 the	 resultant	
discussion	in	a	way	that	obscures	features	of	fundamental	importance.	Even	when	less	
emphasis	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 numbers	 themselves,	 the	 very	 act	 of	modelling	 serves	 to	
constrain	 the	 way	 analysts	 can	 approach	 complex	 issues.	 As	 Martha	 Lampland	 has	
argued,	the	utility	of	processes	whereby	false	or	provisional	numbers	are	produced	is	
highly	context	dependent.98	The	efficacy	of	such	processes	will	also	evolve	over	time.	
Consequently,	 probabilistic	 modelling	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 one	 tool	 amongst	 many	
available	 to	analysts	–	and	 is	not	 something	 that	 should	be	used	 to	 the	exclusion	of	
other	quantitative	or	qualitative	approaches.	
Conclusion	
Risk	 estimation	 in	 the	 area	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 is	 an	 extremely	 challenging	 task.	
Despite	 this	 there	 are	 no	 shortage	 of	 efforts	 to	 quantity	 the	 likelihood	 of	 its	
occurrence.	While	numerical	estimates	have	an	 intrinsic	appeal	and	offer	a	potential	
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means	 of	 benchmarking	 nuclear	 security	 efforts,	 great	 care	 must	 be	 taken	 in	 their	
production.	 Here	 is	 it	 important	 that	 analysts	 understand	 the	 strengths	 and	
weaknesses	of	the	models	that	they	employ	and	caveat	their	conclusions	accordingly.	
However,	to	date	the	majority	of	studies	have	over-reached	and	under-caveated	their	
conclusions,	 through	employing	 inappropriate	models	and	using	data	that	 is	 far	 from	
representative	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism.	 This	 paper	 has	 attempted	 to	 demonstrate,	
through	 outlining	 different	 approaches	 to	 probability	 estimation,	 that	 nuclear	
terrorism	should	be	 considered	as	a	 virtual	 risk	which	escapes	 simple	quantification.	
That	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 models	 cannot	 be	 used,	 but	 instead	 that	 their	
ultimate	purpose	must	be	 reconsidered.	Models	of	nuclear	 terrorism	can	be	used	 to	
structure	thinking	and	to	serve	as	loci	of	discussion,	highlighting	areas	of	disagreement	
and,	 hence,	 serving	 to	 direct	 future	 research	 efforts.	When	 employing	 them	 to	 this	
end,	use	should	be	made	of	expert	groups	over	individuals	and	models	should	look	to	
incorporate	feedback	and	response	mechanisms.	It	should	also	be	recognised	that	the	
development	of	unifying	models	for	the	nuclear	terrorism	phenomenon	as	a	whole	is	
unrealistic.	 Instead	 individual	models	 should	be	 constructed	and	applied	 to	different	
components	 as	 appropriate.	 This	 nuanced	 understanding	 is	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 the	
questionable	results	of	modelling	efforts	in	the	nuclear	terrorism	domain	are	not	over-
sold	to	the	policy-making	community.	
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Figure	1:	Frequency	of	heads	and	tails	observed	in	the	flipping	of	an	unbiased	coin	for	
an	increasing	number	of	flips.	The	dashed	red	line	indicates	50%.	
Table	1:	A	comparison	of	Frequentist	and	Bayesian	approaches	to	probability	
